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Ultimate ownership structure and corporate disclosure quality: 
 Evidence from China 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – This study examines whether the type of ultimate controllers (i.e., private vs. 
state) affects corporate disclosure quality and whether the relationship between the type 
of ultimate controllers and corporate disclosure quality is moderated by the separation of 
ownership and control.   
Design/methodology/approach – This study employs the data of 405 Chinese listed 
firms in 2005.  We review annual reports to collect the data including the type of ultimate 
owners, cash-flow rights, and control rights.  We also collect the rating of corporate 
disclosure quality from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website.  We run the ordered 
logistic regression to test the hypotheses.   
Findings – We find that corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately 
controlled by individuals than for firms ultimately controlled by the state.  We also 
document that the negative effect of private ultimate ownership on corporate disclosure 
quality is stronger for firms with high deviation of cash-flow rights and control rights.   
Practical Implications – Our findings suggest that privatizing state-owned companies 
may increase the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders if the 
privatization does not reduce the separation of cash-flow rights from control rights.  Thus, 
it may be necessary to strengthen the governance role of minority shareholders and 
constrain the divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights of the ultimate 
owners when state-owned companies are privatized.  
Originality/value – This study contributes to the literature on the expropriation of 
minority shareholders by examining the main effect of the type of ultimate controllers 
and the interactive effect of ultimate ownership type and the divergence of ownership and 
control on corporate disclosure quality. 
Keywords  Ownership, Control, Private owners, State, Corporate disclosure. 
Paper type  Research paper 
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1.        Introduction 
 
           Extant research (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishney, 
1988; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 2002) suggests that there exist both incentive 
and entrenchment effects of highly concentrated ownership.  On the one hand, controlling 
ownership may mitigate the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers 
because large shareholders may effectively monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986).  On the other hand, large ownership may increase the conflicts of interest between 
controlling and minority shareholders as large shareholders may behave in their own 
interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).    
          Recently, the costs of large shareholding are highlighted by a stream of research 
that examines the expropriation of minority shareholders and associated corporate 
governance issues arising from the separation of ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash-
flow rights (i.e., ownership) from their control rights (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silances, 
and Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and 
Lang, 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002; Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu, 2004; Attig, Fong, 
Gadhoum, and Lang, 2006).  When ultimate controllers’ ownership is lower than their 
control (voting) rights, they are more likely to expropriate minority shareholders because 
the expropriation is less restrained by their own cash-flow stake (Attig et al., 2006).   
          More recently, using Chinese listed firms’ loan guarantees to related parties as a 
proxy for expropriation, Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2009) find that firms with state non-
corporate controlling block holders are less likely to issue related guarantees than other 
firms.1  Their findings imply that the expropriation of minority shareholders may be less 
for firms ultimately controlled by the state than by private owners.  Berkman et al. (2009) 
argue that the state may be less motivated to expropriate minority shareholders than 
private owners since the monetary benefits from expropriation can be captured more 
easily and directly by private owners than by bureaucrats running a government entity.  
However, there is limited research in the literature to address this issue.  Moreover, this 
issue is important because it relates to the costs and benefits of privatizing state-owned 
companies.  Thus, it is warranted to investigate whether the type of ultimate controllers 
(state vs. private) affects the expropriation of minority shareholders.   
          To shed light on this question, this study examines whether the type of ultimate 
controllers affects corporate disclosure quality and whether the effect of the type of 
ultimate controllers is moderated by the deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights.  
We are interested in corporate disclosure quality because it well reflects corporate 
governance quality.  Controlling owners who expropriate minority shareholders are more 
likely to obscure and delay the disclosure of related information and manipulate 
accounting numbers to hide the adverse effect of their expropriation on firm performance.  
To do so, those owners may execute their influence over board of directors to impair 
monitoring mechanisms.  Thus, the expropriation of minority shareholders may lead to 
lower corporate governance quality, and then lower corporate disclosure quality.   
          This study focuses on the Chinese data for the following reasons: (1) Chinese listed 
companies have high ownership concentration, (2) a high proportion of Chinese listed 
companies are ultimately controlled by the state, and (3) Chinese listed companies are 
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required to disclose information about the ultimate ownership structure in annual reports.  
Using a sample of 405 listed firms across 22 industries in 2005 and the rating of 
corporate disclosure quality issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, we find that 
corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms with private ultimate owners than for firms 
with state ultimate owners.  We also find that the negative effect of private ultimate 
ownership on corporate disclosure quality is stronger when the deviation of cash-flow 
rights from control rights is large.  Our findings suggest that private ultimate owners are 
more likely to expropriate minority shareholders than state ultimate owners, especially 
when cash-flow rights are highly separated from control rights. 
           This study contributes to the literature as follows.  First, our study extends a 
growing corporate governance research on the expropriation of minority shareholders.  
Unlike prior research that focuses on the main effect of the separation of ownership from 
control (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; Attig et al., 2006), this study 
focuses on the effects of ultimate controllers’ type on corporate governance issues arising 
from the divergence of ownership and control.  It is important to examine whether the 
entrenchment costs incurred by large shareholdings are higher for private-controlled 
firms than for state-controlled firms because it can provide implications for the costs and 
benefits of privatizing state-owned companies.   
           Second, this study adds to the extant limited accounting literature on the 
relationship between minority shareholders’ expropriation and financial reporting quality.  
Unlike existing studies by Fan and Wong (2002) and Haw et al. (2004) that measure 
financial reporting quality by earnings-return relation and discretionary accruals and use 
cross-country data, our study employs a more comprehensive measure of financial 
reporting quality and associated corporate governance.  Moreover, focusing on a 
country’s data in our study can avoid the potential confounding effects due to different 
country-level institutional infrastructures.   
            Third, this study enriches the literature on corporate disclosure quality.  Although 
there is a large body of research that examines the association between corporate 
disclosure quality and corporate governance (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta, 2005; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005), to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one to 
investigate the relationship among corporate disclosure quality, the type of ultimate 
ownership, and the divergence of cash-flow rights and control rights.  
           Fourth, this study also evaluates the credibility and usefulness of the rating of 
corporate disclosure quality issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  To the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first one to provide empirical evidence on assessing the 
rating.  Our findings provide an implication to investors, Chinese securities regulators 
and stock exchanges, that the Shenzhen Stock Exchange’s rating is credible and useful.   
          The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces 
institutional background.  Section 3 reviews the literature.  Section 4 develops 
hypotheses.  Section 5 discusses the methodology.  Section 6 presents empirical results.  
Section 7 concludes.   
 
              
 
3 
 
2.       Institutional background 
 
           With the original intention of raising capital for state-owned enterprises from the 
public, China reopened its stock markets in the early 1990s.  Thus, most Chinese listed 
companies originated from state-owned companies.  The listed companies are mandated 
to have three different classes of shares, i.e., state-owned shares, legal person shares, and 
individual shares.  State-owned shares are held by the central, provincial, or municipal 
governments.  Legal person shares are owned by legal entities including domestic or 
foreign enterprises and institutions.  Individual shares are publicly issued to individual 
persons.  Obviously, state-owned shares and individual shares are ultimately owned by 
the state and private investors, respectively, but legal person shares could be ultimately 
held by either the state or individual persons.  
          Unlike corporate disclosure environments in other countries, corporate disclosure 
of Chinese listed companies has been highly regulated by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), a government agency that officially enacts the regulations of the 
Chinese securities markets.  Based on the corporate disclosure requirements of the CSRC, 
listed companies should disclose information in annual reports including company 
background, summary of operating results, directors’ report, financial statements, 
material events, related companies, etc.  The annual reports have the similar content and 
format for all listed companies.  Since corporate disclosure is highly mandated, there is 
scarce room for Chinese listed companies to make voluntary disclosure.  The special 
feature of the Chinese corporate disclosure environment indicates that it is vital for 
researchers to allow for extensive and multi-dimensional measures that can reflect the 
overall quality rather than only a single aspect of corporate disclosure.  
 
 
3.        Literature review 
 
           There is a growing literature that examines the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by ultimate controllers.  La Porta et al. (1999) investigate ownership 
structures of companies from 27 countries.  They find that few of the firms are widely 
held except in countries with strong investor protection.  They also find that ultimate 
owners typically use superior voting rights to exercise control over the firms even when 
they have limited ownership.  Claessens et al. (2000) examine the deviation of cash-flow 
rights and control rights in nine East Asian countries.  They find that family-controlled 
firms and small firms have a large separation of ownership and control, and that 
managers of family-controlled firms are more likely to be the relatives of the family.  
These two studies suggest that the ownership structure of firms facilitates controlling 
shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders.  More explicitly, Claessens et al. 
(2002) document that firm value decreases in the deviation of cash-flow rights and 
control rights, consistent with the entrenchment effect of large shareholdings.   
           Recently, Berkman et al. (2009) find that firms with state non-corporate 
controllers are less likely to issue loan guarantees to related parties than other firms in 
China, suggesting that state controllers are less likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders than private controllers.  Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) compare performance 
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of Chinese listed firms with different types of controllers.  They find that private 
controlled firms perform worse than state-owned firms affiliated to the central 
government, and argue that private controllers may expropriate the income and assets of 
their firms away from minority shareholders.  Wu, Xu, and Yuan (2009) examine 
whether the type of controllers affects the relationship between ownership concentration 
and legal investor protection in China.  They find that an inverse relationship between 
ownership concentration and legal investor protection exists only for firms with private 
controllers but not for firms with state controllers, suggesting that state controlling serves 
as a substitute to legal investor protection.   
           There are several extant studies that investigate the effects of the separation of 
cash-flow rights from control rights on financial reporting quality and corporate 
information environment.  Fan and Wong (2002) examine the association between 
earnings-return relation and ownership structure for a sample of 977 firms in seven East 
Asian countries.2  They find that earnings-return relation is lower for firms with a high 
divergence between the ultimate owner’s cash-flow rights and control rights.  Haw et al. 
(2004) examine the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and income 
management in nine East Asian and thirteen Western European countries.3  They find that 
income management is positively associated with the detachment of cash-flow rights 
from control rights of ultimate owners, and that this association is less pronounced in 
countries with high statutory protection of minority rights and effective extra-legal 
institutions.  These two studies suggest that the ultimate ownership affects earnings 
quality.  Attig et al. (2006) examine whether the deviation of ownership and control 
rights is associated with information asymmetry and stock liquidity.  They find that firms 
with a high separation of cash-flow rights and control rights have a greater information 
asymmetry component of their bid-ask spread and a wider quoted bid-ask spread, 
suggesting that the ultimate ownership structure affects corporate information 
environment.  
           Prior research also suggests that corporate disclosure can reflect corporate 
governance quality.  Using the U.S. data, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that the occurrence of 
management earnings forecasts is positively associated with board independence, a proxy 
for board governance quality.  They also document that management earnings forecasts 
are more accurate and less optimistically biased for firms with greater board 
independence, and that firms with greater institutional ownership are less likely to issue 
management earnings forecasts.  Moreover, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that 
managers are more likely to issue or update earnings forecasts when firms have more 
effective board and audit committee structures in U.S.   
             
 
4.        Hypotheses 
 
           Prior research suggests that agency costs may arise from highly concentrated 
ownership.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999) argue that high 
ownership concentration leads to the conflicts of interest between large and small 
shareholders.  As large shareholders effectively control corporations, they are likely to 
expropriate the interest of minority shareholders.  For instance, controlling shareholders 
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can benefit themselves by not paying out dividends, or by transferring profits to other 
firms under their control.  Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) develop a theoretical 
model that suggests an ex ante expropriation threat of tight control of large shareholders 
on small shareholders.  
           Prior literature further suggests that a likely effect of expropriating minority 
shareholders is that the information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and 
minority shareholders may increase (Attig et al., 2006).  When controlling shareholders 
enrich themselves by executing corporate projects at the expense of minority interest, 
they are likely to obscure and delay the disclosure of related information.  Thus, less 
relevant and adequate information will be disclosed when ultimate owners use their 
control rights to extract rent from minority shareholders.  As a result, minority 
shareholders would not have adequate information to timely intervene and scrutinize 
those projects.  Controlling owners may manipulate accounting numbers to hide the 
adverse effect of their expropriation on firm performance.  Hence, controlling owners are 
likely to execute influence over board of directors and then impair monitoring 
mechanisms, resulting in low corporate disclosure quality.4   
          Berkman et al. (2009) use Chinese listed firms’ loan guarantees to related parties as 
a proxy for expropriation, and find that related guarantees are less likely to be issued by 
firms with state non-corporate controlling block holders than by other firms.  This 
suggests that private controllers may be more motivated to expropriate minority 
shareholders than the state because the monetary benefits from expropriation can be 
captured more easily and directly by private owners than by bureaucrats running a 
government entity.  Chen, Firth, and Xu (2009) argue that it is easier for private 
controllers to expropriate the income and assets of Chinese listed firms away from 
minority shareholders because private controllers are not subject to monitoring by the 
state.  As a result, the entrenchment effect of large shareholdings is higher for firms 
ultimately controlled by private owners than by the state.  Thus, we hypothesize that 
corporate disclosure quality is lower for private-controlled firms than for state-controlled 
firms.  The first hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H1:     Corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately controlled by private 
owners than for firms ultimately controlled by the state. 
           Prior research (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999) also suggests that the conflicts of interest 
between large and small shareholders are more pronounced when control rights of 
ultimate owners exceed their cash-flow rights.  Large shareholders whose control rights 
are greater than their cash-flow rights may have greater incentives to extract value from 
minority shareholders because this expropriation is less restrained by controlling 
shareholders’ own cash-flow stake.  Claessens et al. (2002) document evidence that a 
deviation of ownership from control rights is negatively associated with market valuation, 
suggesting that the deviation leads to agency costs and thus decreases firm value.  
Ultimate owners seem to behave more selfishly when there is a discrepancy between 
control rights and cash-flow rights.  Firms with a separation of ownership from control 
are likely to have more agency problems.  Thus, the negative effect of private ultimate 
ownership on corporate disclosure quality may be stronger for firms with high divergence 
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between control rights and cash-flow rights.  We develop the second hypothesis as 
follows: 
H2:     The negative effect of private ultimate ownership on corporate disclosure quality 
is stronger for firms with large deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights than for 
firms with small deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights. 
 
 
5.        Methodology 
 
5.1.     Ultimate ownership structure 
           We use Chinese data in this study because the ownership of publicly traded firms 
is highly concentrated in China.5  Moreover, the legal enforcement for protecting 
minority shareholders seems weak in China (Cai, 2007).  As many Chinese listed 
companies are ultimately controlled by the state, focusing on Chinese data may increase 
the power of testing our hypotheses.  More importantly, as required by the CSRC, 
Chinese publicly traded firms have started to disclose information about ultimate 
controlling shareholders in annual reports since 2001, thus providing us a unique 
opportunity to easily and clearly identify ultimate owners.  Methodologically, focusing on 
one country’s data can avoid country-level effects that may confound previous studies 
using cross-country data (Fan and Wong, 2002; Haw et al., 2004).6   
           Ultimate owners are those who have voting rights in the firm and who are not 
controlled by anyone else.  In China, the ultimate owner usually controls the listed 
company through a pyramidal structure in which at least one company lies between the 
ultimate owner and the downstream listed company.  For Chinese publicly traded firms, 
information about the ultimate owner of the largest shareholder is mandatorily released in 
their annual reports.  Thus, we are able to identify the ultimate owner even though the 
largest shareholder of a listed company is not a publicly traded company.7  Based on the 
information disclosed in annual reports, we can determine whether the ultimate controller 
is a private owner or the state.   
           Following prior research (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2002), we 
identify the separation of cash-flow rights from control rights based on information about 
ownership and control contained in Chinese annual reports.  For example, State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of Shenzhen Municipal Government 
(SASACSMG) owns 100% of Shenzhen Construction Investment Holding Company, 
which is the largest shareholder and owns 34.8% of Shenzhen Changcheng Investment 
Holding. Co., Ltd., a company listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  In this example, 
the ultimate owner is the state as SASACSMG is a government agency.  The ultimate 
shareholder owns 34.8% of both control rights and cash-flow rights (i.e., 34.8% × 100%) 
of Shenzhen Changcheng Investment Holding. Co., Ltd.  The equality of control rights to 
cash-flow rights of the ultimate controlling owner indicates no separation of cash-flow 
rights from control rights for this company.  For another company listed on the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, Shenzhen SEG. Dashang Co., Ltd is owned 28% by its largest 
shareholder, Guangzhou Bouhong Investment Co. Ltd, which is owned 50% by its largest 
shareholder, Chengbi Li, who is an individual person.  Thus, the ultimate owner of this 
listed company is a private owner, who owns 28% of the control rights and 14% (i.e., 
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28% × 50%) of the cash-flow rights, indicating a separation of cash-flow rights from 
control rights.  Like prior research (e.g., Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and Wong, 2002; 
Haw et al., 2004), we measure the deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights by the 
ratio of cash-flow rights to control rights, which is lower if cash-flow rights are highly 
detached from control rights.   
         
5.2.     Rating of corporate disclosure quality 
            We use the annual rating issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange to measure the 
quality of corporate disclosure for Chinese listed companies.  The Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange began to assess the quality of information disclosure for listed firms since the 
fiscal year of 2001.8  The assessment is based on information disclosure activities 
engaged by listed firms during a fiscal year.  The rating is classified into four categories 
including “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor”, for which we code “3”, “2”, “1”, and 
“0”, respectively, as the value of the dependent variable in our regression model, i.e., 
corporate disclosure quality.  
           The Shenzhen Stock Exchange rates each listed firm critically on the basis of four 
information disclosure quality attributes: timeliness, precision, completeness, and 
compliance.  The timeliness of information disclosure reflects how timely periodic or 
transitory corporate disclosure reports are issued.  The precision of information disclosure 
measures whether the disclosure is succinct and clear, and whether the disclosure is 
confused, misleading, and fraudulent.  The completeness of information disclosure 
indicates whether information is fully disclosed or lack of disclosure.  The compliance of 
information disclosure reveals the extent to which the disclosure is compliant with the 
requirements stipulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  In addition to the above four attributes, each firm is also 
assessed on how quickly it replies to the Exchange’s inquiring, whether board of directors 
urges the firm to disclose in ways required by the Exchange, and whether the firm 
communicates information to the Exchange when irregular situations occur.  The rating 
also considers whether and how many times a listed firm has received award or penalty 
from the China Securities Regulatory Commission or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.   
          Overall, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange provides an extensive and multi-
dimensional measure of corporate disclosure quality, which well reflects corporate 
governance quality of listed companies.  To ensure the appropriateness of using this 
rating as a proxy for corporate disclosure quality, we will empirically evaluate the 
credibility and usefulness of the rating in the later text. 
 
5.3.     Regression analysis  
           First, we evaluate the rating of corporate disclosure quality issued by the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange by estimating the following OLS regression model: 
          RET = β0 + β1 DISQ+ β2 EARN + β3 DISC*EARN + ε                                   (1) 
where  
            RET  = stock return, computed as the annual stock return including dividends,  
           DISQ = corporate disclosure quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the quality  
                        rating of “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” issued by the Shenzhen   
                     Stock Exchange, 
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         EARN = earnings, measured as net income deflated by the beginning market value  
                     of common shares outstanding. 
Model (1) is based on Easton and Harris (1991) who show a positive association between 
stock return and earnings, suggesting that accounting information is useful for investment 
decision-making.  To evaluate the rating, we include DISQ and DISQ*EARN in the 
model.  The coefficient on DISQ reflects the relationship between stock return and the 
rating, while the coefficient on DISQ*EARN reflects the effect of the rating on the 
association between stock return and earnings.  If the rating is credible and useful in 
measuring corporate disclosure quality, we expect that firms with high rating will have 
higher investment value and higher usefulness of accounting information.  Thus, the 
coefficients on DISQ and DISQ*EARN are both expected to be positive if the rating 
really captures corporate disclosure quality.  Based on Easton and Harris (1991), we 
expect a positive coefficient on EARN.  
           Second, we run the following ordered logistic regression model to test our 
hypotheses by controlling for other factors that may affect corporate disclosure quality: 
       DISQ = β0 + β1PRIVATE + β2CASHCTRL + β3PRIVATE *CASHCTRL + β4BDIND   
                 + β5 BDSIZE + β6 FSIZE + β7 ROE + β8 MB + Industry dummies + ε          (2) 
where 
    PRIVATE = private control, coded “1” if firms are ultimately controlled by private  
                      owners and “0” otherwise, 
CASHCTRL = deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights, measured by the ratio of  
                     cash-flow rights to control rights,  
       BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors  
                     on the board, 
     BDSIZE = board size, measured as the number of directors on the board,  
 
        FSIZE =firm size, measured as the log of total assets, 
          ROE = return on equity, measured by the ratio of net income to common equity, 
           MB = market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of  
                    common equity to the book value of common equity. 
           We include several control variables in model (2) based on the literature.9  Both 
BDIND and BDSIZE are added in model (2) since extant studies (e.g., Klein, 2002; 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005) suggest that board characteristics are associated with the 
quality of financial reporting.  In addition, we include other firm characteristics such as 
FSIZE, ROE, and MB because prior research (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Khanna, 
Palepu, and Srinivasan, 2004; Bamber and Cheon, 1998) finds that those characteristics 
also affect corporate disclosure quality.  To control for fixed industry effects, we also add 
industry dummies for each industry from which there are at least 10 firms in the sample. 
           In model (2), we expect a negative and significant coefficient on PRIVATE if H1 is 
supported.  Since a high value of CASHCTRL indicates low divergence between cash-
flow rights and control rights, we expect a positive and significant coefficient on the 
interaction term of PRIVATE and CASHCTRL if H2 is supported.  We also expect a 
positive coefficient on CASHCTRL (Haw et al., 2004).  Based on prior research (e.g., 
Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Khanna et al., 2004; Bamber 
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and Cheon, 1998), we expect a positive coefficient on BDIND, BDSIZE, FSIZE, and 
ROE, and a negative coefficient on MB. 
 
 
 6.      Empirical results 
 
           The sample selection begins by collecting corporate disclosure quality ratings of 
listed firms for the fiscal year of 2005 from the official website of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange (i.e., http://www.szse.cn).  This yields a raw sample of 547 listed firms with 
corporate disclosure quality data available for 2005.  Next, we review 2005 annual 
reports of the 547 firms from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange website to identify their 
ultimate controllers, control rights, cash-flow rights, and board information.  After 
excluding firms that didn’t provide clear and complete information about ultimate 
controllers or boards in their annual reports, the sample size is reduced to 461 firms.  The 
reduced sample is then merged with the Datastream database from which financial data 
used in the analysis are collected.  The final sample consists of 405 listed firms that meet 
the requirement of data availability for computing control variables.   
         Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample firms by industry.  We find that our 
sample involves 22 CSRC industries, of which machinery and equipment (15.80%), 
petrochemical and plastics (12.84%), metal and nonmetal (9.63%), medicine and biology 
(7.65%), information technology (6.67%), and wholesale and retail (6.17%) are the most 
widely represented industries in the sample. 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of sample firms by industry 
        
CSRC Codes Industry Description Frequency Percent (%) 
A Agriculture, forestry, poultry, and fishing    11 2.72 
C0 Food and drink 15 3.70 
C1 Textile and clothing 19 4.69 
C4 Petrochemical and plastics 52 12.84 
C5 Electronics 11 2.72 
C6 Metal and nonmetal 39 9.63 
C7 Machinery and equipment 64 15.80 
C8 Medicine and biology 31 7.65 
D Utilities  17 4.20 
F Transportation and storage 14 3.46 
G Information technology  27 6.67 
H Wholesale and retail  25 6.17 
J Real estate  18 4.44 
K Social service 18 4.44 
M Conglomerate 16 3.95 
Others   28 6.91 
Total  22 industries 405 100.00 
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          Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of variables.  On average, corporate 
disclosure quality of our sample firms is rated between “Good” and “Fair”.  The mean 
deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights is 0.742, which is tremendously close to 
0.746, the mean deviation of a sample of 2,611 firms from the nine East Asian countries 
reported in Claessens et al. (2000).  About 28% of the sample firms are ultimately 
controlled by private owners.  Moreover, the mean board independence and board size 
are 33.3% and 9, respectively.   
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
              
Variable  N Mean Median  Std Q1 Q3 
DISQ 405 1.73 2.00 0.75 1.00 2.00 
PRIVATE 405 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 
CASHCTRL 405 0.74 1.00 0.33 0.49 1.00 
BDIND 405 0.35 0.33 0.05 0.33 0.36 
BDSIZE 405 9.35 9.00 1.97 8.00 11.00 
FSIZE 405 3.02 2.98 0.32 2.80 3.19 
ROE 405 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.09 
MB 405 2.00 1.68 2.40 1.15 2.30 
       
Notes: DISQ is corporate disclosure quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the quality rating of 
“Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” issued by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, respectively.  PRIVATE 
is private control, coded “1” if firms are ultimately controlled by private owners and “0” otherwise.  
CASHCTRL is deviation of cash flow rights from control rights, measured by the ratio of cash flow rights to 
control rights.  BDIND is board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on the 
board.  BDSIZE is board size, measured as the number of directors on the board.  FSIZE is firm size, 
measured as the log of total assets.  ROE is return on equity, measured by the ratio of net income to 
common equity.  MB is market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of common equity 
to the book value of common equity. 
      
           Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among variables.  We find that 
corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately controlled by private owners 
(r=-0.15) and firms with high divergence between ownership and control (r=0.16).  
Corporate disclosure quality is positively correlated with firm size and firm performance.  
The deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights is higher for firms ultimately 
controlled by private owners or for smaller firms.  Smaller firms or higher growth firms 
are more likely to have private ultimate controllers.  Larger firms have larger board of 
directors.  The correlation between firm size and return on equity is 0.48.  Other 
correlation coefficients are all less than 0.48.  Since correlations between independent 
variables are not excessively high, multicollinearity is unlikely to be a substantive issue 
in this study. 
         Table 4 includes the results of evaluating the credibility and usefulness of the rating.  
Using the rating data over the period 2001 to 2005, we find positive and significant 
coefficients for both DISQ (t-statistic = 2.94, p < .01) and DISQ*EARN (t-statistic = 4.92, 
p < .01).10  These results suggest that firms with high ratings have better performance and 
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that their accounting information is more value relevant.  Thus, the rating is credible and 
useful in terms of capturing corporate disclosure quality. 
 
Table 3: Pearson correlations 
                
Variable  PRIVATE CASHCTRL BDIND BDSIZE FSIZE   ROE  MB 
DISQ -0.15*** 0.16***        0.03     0.09* 0.37*** 0.39***   -0.02 
PRIVATE  -0.44***       0.09* -0.18*** -0.28*** 0.06   0.15*** 
CASHCTRL         -0.02   0.14*** 0.18*** 0.03  -0.10** 
BDIND    -0.22***    -0.03 0.02    0.02 
BDSIZE     0.18***  0.09*    0.03 
FSIZE           0.48***    0.02 
ROE              0.23*** 
  
 
     
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Table 4: Results on evaluating the rating  
        
Variable Predicted sign  Coefficient                       t-statistic 
Intercept ? -0.23 -20.48*** 
DISQ + 0.02                          2.94*** 
EARN + 0.62                          5.32*** 
DISQ*EARN + 0.41                          4.92*** 
    
N                     2,098 
F-statistic    107.05*** 
Adj. R2                          13.17% 
    
Notes: We run the OLS regression, where the dependent variable is stock return, computed as the annual 
stock return including dividends.  DISQ is corporate disclosure quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the 
quality rating of “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, respectively.  
EARN is earnings, measured as net income deflated by the beginning market value of common shares 
outstanding.  *** indicates significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed). 
 
           Table 5 presents the results of the ordered logistic regression for testing the 
hypotheses.  We find that the coefficient on PRIVATE is negative and significant (χ2 = 
4.09, p < .05), consistent with H1.  The results show that corporate disclosure quality is 
lower for firms ultimately controlled by private owners than for firms ultimately 
controlled by the state.  This suggests that private ultimate owners are more likely to 
expropriate minority shareholders than the state.  We also find a positive and significant 
coefficient on the interaction of PRIVATE and CASHCTRL (χ2 = 2.82, p < .05), consistent 
with H2.  These results suggest that the negative effect of private ultimate ownership on 
corporate disclosure quality is stronger for firms with large deviation of cash-flow rights 
from control rights than for firms with small deviation of cash-flow rights from control 
rights.  Thus, it is important to examine the interaction effect of private ultimate 
ownership and the separation of ownership and control on the expropriation of minority 
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shareholders.  Our findings imply that the agency issues arising from the expropriation by 
private ultimate controllers are severer when firms’ cash-flow rights are highly detached 
from their control rights. 
 
Table 5: Results on testing the hypotheses 
        
Variable Predicted sign  Coefficient                           χ2 
Intercept3 ? -8.73  27.90*** 
Intercept2 ? -5.36  11.13*** 
Intercept1 ? -3.07                       3.68** 
PRIVATE - -1.09                       4.09** 
CASHCTRL + 0.15                    0.13 
PRIVATE*CASHCTRL + 1.33                        2.82** 
BDIND + 1.94                    0.78 
BDSIZE + 0.04                    0.51 
FSIZE + 1.36  11.54*** 
ROE + 11.44 32.16*** 
MB - -0.06                     1.87* 
    
Industry dummies                       Included 
    
N                        405 
LR statistic    116.54*** 
-2 Log L                    782.73 
    
Notes: We run the ordered logistic regression, where the dependent variable is corporate disclosure 
quality, coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the quality rating of “Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor” by 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, respectively.  The coefficient on PRIVATE is expected to be negative if 
corporate disclosure quality is lower for firms ultimately controlled by private individuals than for firms 
ultimately controlled by the state.  The coefficient on PRIVATE*CASHCTRL is expected to be positive if 
the negative effect of private ultimate ownership is weaker for firms with low deviation of cash-flow rights 
from control rights than for firms with high deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
           We include two board governance measures, namely, board independence and 
board size, in the ordered logistic regression to examine the effect of board governance 
on corporate disclosure quality.  We are interested in this issue because La Porta et al. 
(2000) suggest that weak investor protection leads to lower quality corporate governance 
compared to countries with strong investor protection regimes.  Board governance 
mechanisms in weaker investor protection regimes like China may not be as effective as 
those in stronger investor protection regimes.  Consistent with our concern on Chinese 
board governance, we find that corporate disclosure quality is not significantly associated 
with either board independence or board size. 
           We also add three financial variables including firm size, return on equity, and 
market-to-book ratio in the ordered logistic regression to control for the effects of other 
firm characteristics on corporate disclosure quality.  Larger firms usually have lower 
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disclosure costs and more transparent information environments than smaller firms.  Like 
Lang and Lundholm (1993), we document a positive association between corporate 
disclosure quality and firm size (χ2 = 11.54, p < .01).  Firms with better firm performance 
may be more willing to disclose information.  We find that corporate disclosure quality is 
positively associated with firm performance (χ2 = 32.16, p < .01), consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Khanna et al., 2004).  High growth firms may 
be less willing to disclose information because proprietary information cost is higher for 
those firms (Bamber and Cheon, 1998).  As expected, we find a negative relationship 
between corporate disclosure quality and market-to-book ratio, a proxy for growth 
opportunities (χ2 = 1.87, p < .10).  
           In addition, we examine the effect of the deviation of cash-flow rights from control 
rights on corporate disclosure quality for firms with private ultimate ownership and firms 
with state ultimate ownership, respectively.  We run the following ordered logistic 
regression separately for each type of firms: 
     DISQ = β0 + β1CASHCTRL+ β2BDIND + β3 BDSIZE + β4 FSIZE + β5 ROE  
                + β6 MB + Industry dummies + ε                                                     (3) 
We find that the coefficient on CASHCTRL in model (3) is positive and significant for 
firms with private ultimate ownership (non-tabulated χ2 = 4.53, p < .05), while the 
coefficient on CASHCRL is insignificant for firms with state ultimate ownership (non-
tabulated χ2 = 0.10).  These results suggest that large divergence between ownership and 
control leads to low corporate disclosure quality for firms with private ultimate 
ownership, but not for firms with state ultimate ownership. This finding is consistent with 
the notion that private ultimate owners are more likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders than state ultimate owners, especially when cash-flow rights are highly 
separated from control rights. 
 
7.       Conclusion 
 
           This study examines whether private ultimate ownership negatively affects 
corporate disclosure quality and whether the negative effect of private ultimate ownership 
on corporate disclosure quality is moderated by the deviation of cash-flow rights from 
control rights.  Using a sample of 405 Chinese listed firms in 2005, we document a 
negative association between corporate disclosure quality and private ultimate ownership.  
We also find that corporate disclosure quality is more negatively associated with private 
ultimate ownership when the deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights is large.  
Our findings suggest that private ultimate owners are more likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders and that corporate governance issues arising from private large 
shareholdings are severer for firms with large divergence of ownership and control.  
           This study makes several contributions as follows.  First, our study contributes to 
the agency theory by examining the relationship between ultimate controllers’ type and 
the expropriation of minority shareholders, and the moderating effect of the deviation of 
cash-flow rights and control rights.  Second, we extend the limited research on the effects 
of minority shareholders’ expropriation on financial reporting quality by focusing on a 
more comprehensive measure of financial reporting quality and associated corporate 
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governance quality.  Third, this study adds to the literature on corporate disclosure quality 
by examining the association between corporate disclosure quality and the expropriation 
of minority shareholders.  Fourth, this study also provides empirical evidence on the 
credibility and usefulness of the rating of corporate disclosure quality issued by the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
          This study also provides some implications for public policy making.  First, it may 
be necessary to strengthen the governance role of minority shareholders, especially when 
ultimate controllers are private owners and cash-flow rights are highly separated from 
control rights, so that minority shareholders can effectively monitor controlling 
shareholders to protect their interests.  Second, since the expropriation of minority 
shareholders by private ultimate controllers is magnified when ownership is highly 
detached from control,  it may be necessary to constrain the divergence between cash-
flow rights and control rights of the ultimate owners especially in countries with great 
state-owned economy like China, which is increasingly privatizing state-controlled firms.  
Third, it may be valuable for Chinese securities regulators or stock exchanges to 
officially rate the corporate disclosure quality of Chinese listed companies.  
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Endnotes: 
                                                     
1
    Other firms include firms with state corporate block holders, private block holders, or foreign 
block holders, among which state corporate block holders are also ultimately controlled by the 
state. 
2
     The seven East Asian countries include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. 
3
     The nine East Asian countries include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  The thirteen Western European countries include 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  
4
         Jaggi, Leung, and Gul (2009) find that the monitoring effectiveness of independent 
corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms.  
5
      The mean control rights and cash-flow rights of our sample firms are 40.11% and 30.20%, 
respectively, which are greater than the 9 East Asia countries except for the cash-flow rights of 
Thailand (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). 
6
       Fan and Wong (2002) focus on seven countries’ data and earnings-return relation. A concern 
on comparing earnings-return relation across countries is that stock prices are not equally 
informative across countries (Bushman and Piotroski 2006).  Haw et al. (2004) use 22 countries’ 
data and discretionary accruals to measure earnings management.  Wysocki (2005) finds that 
accrual quality is not an appropriate measure of earnings quality in non-U.S. countries.  Likewise, 
it is unclear whether the Jones model used for computing discretionary accruals perform equally 
well across countries.  
7
       Prior studies identify ultimate owners by only using data limited for listed firms, which may 
lead to measurement errors if the ultimate owner owns an unlisted firm who is the largest 
shareholder of the downstream listed company (Haw et al. 2004). 
8
      Shanghai Stock Exchange, another Chinese stock exchange, does not assess the corporate 
disclosure quality of its listed companies.  
9
         All continuous variables in the regression are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
10
        We also estimate model (1) by using a dummy variable, which is coded “1” for the rating 
of “Excellent” and “Good” and “0” otherwise.  We find that the coefficients on DISQ and 
DISQ*EARN are positive and significant (non-tabulated t-statistic = 2.12, p<.05, and t-statistic = 
6.01, p<.01), similar to the results when DISQ is coded “3”, “2”, “1”, and “0” for the rating of 
“Excellent”, “Good”, “Fair”, and “Poor”, respectively. 
